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There has been considerable judicial as well as academic
criticism" of the hair-splitting technicalities distinguishing first
and second degree murder as the result of words of art used to
define the degrees of murder. But since the American legislatures have been prone to enact statutes calling for such refinements, it has been the duty of the legal profession and the
courts to interpret and apply them. Unfortunately, all too frequently, both the bar and the bench have been careless and inexact in the use of terms thus resulting in confusion and dissipating the clear rule of guidance which the attorney seeks and the
client demands.
North Dakota in following this general trend has divided
murder into two degrees by providing: "Every murder perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by torture, or
by other willful, deliberate or premeditated killing, or in committing or attempting to commit any sodomy, rape, mayhem,
arson, robbery, or burglary, shall be deemed murder in the first
degree; all other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder in
the second degree."12 It is obvious at the outset that the North
Dakota statute defining first degree murder divides itself into
three categories. The first is where perpetrated by means of
poison, or lying in wait, or by torture; the second is where
results from the commission of certain specified felonies which
are commonly considered felonies of violence-sodomy, rape,
mayhem, arson, robbery and burglary; and the third is when it
is by any willful, deliberate or premeditated killing. It is with
this third category that the present comment is concerned.
Under the common law felonious homicide-which was the
killing of a human creature, of any age or sex, without justification or excuse 3 -was divided into manslaughter and murder.4 The distinguishing characteristic between murder and
manslaughter was the existence of malice aforethought in the
former and its absence in the latter. Blackstone summarized
1. Cardoza, Law and Literature and Other Essays and Addresses (1931), page 97.
2. First enacted by North Dakota Code (1895) §7065 it is contained presently in
North Dakota Code (1943) §12-2712.
3. 4 Blaekstone's Commentaries (Lewis' Ed.) 190.
4. 4 Blaekstone's Commentaries (Lewis' Ed.) 188.
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the rule as " ... the killing must be committed with malice
aforethought, to make the crime of murder. This is the grand
criterion which now distinguishes murder from other killing;
and this malice prepense, malitia praecogitata, not so properly
spite or malevolence to the deceased in particular, as any evil
design in general; the dictate of a wicked, depraved, and malignant heart ... and it may be either express or implied in
law." 5 Thus the all important element was that of malice aforethought. While this element may be evidenced by personally
malevolent feelings, it is not malice in the ordinary layman
sense and therefore does not necessarily mean personal hatred
or revenge against the person killed. 6 Malice aforethought is a
condition of the mind in which one unlawfully and voluntarily
does a serious bodily injury to another in willful disregard of
his legal rights, or does a cruel act voluntarily without excuse,
justification, or extenuation. 7 It does not imply deliberation,
or the lapse of considerable time between the intent to take life
and the actual execution of that intent, but rather denotes
".. . purpose and design, in contradistinction to accident and
mischance. "8 ". .. It may spring up at the instant, and may
be inferred from the act of killing" '9 so long as it is the moving
cause of the act or concomitant with the act. Thus, malice
aforethought has been raised not only in those cases where the
accused had an unlawful intention to kill' 0 but also where death
resulted from intentionally infficted great bodily harm" or
death resulted to another unintentionally from wantonly reckless conduct on the part of the accused 2 or death resulted unintentionally to a human being from the accused's commission of
13
or attempted commission of a felony.
Prior to 1895, the North Dakota Code did not provide for the
division of murder into degrees and simply stated: "Homicide
is murder in the following cases: 1. When perpetrated without
authority of law, and with a premeditated design to effect death
of the person killed, or of any other human being. 2. When
perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous to others and
5. 4 Blackstone 's Commentaries (Lewis' Ed.) 198.
6. 2 Burdick, The Law of Grimes §448b.
7. State v. Wetter, 11 Idaho 433, 83 Pac. 341, 346 (1905). For an excellent
discussion see Turner v. Commonwealth, 167 Ky. 365, 180 S.W. 768 (1915).
8. Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. [Mass.] 295 (1850).
9. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 495 (1896). It is to be noted that the
Court grasping for words to describe malice aforethought used approvingly the words
"deliberately" and "premeditation."
10. State v. Young, 50 W.Va. 96, 40 S.E. 334 (1901).
11. Durr v. State, 175 Miss. 797, 168 So. 65 (1936).
12. Banks v. State, 85 Tex. Cr. R. 165, 211 S.W. 217 (1919); People v. Jernatowski, 238 N.Y. 188, 144 N.E. 497 (1924).
13. Rex v. Elnick, 53 D.L.R. 298 (1920) Mant. Ct. of Appeal.
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evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life, although
without any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individual. 3. When perpetrated without design to effect
14
death by a person engaged in the commission of any felony.'
Thus it is seen that the definition of murder merely incorporated the decisional law of common law murder with "premeditated design" being used to describe the element of "express
malice aforethought.'1 5 The punishment provided for murder
was death or imprisonment at hard labor in the territorial penitentiary for life, in the discretion of the jury. 6 In 1895, a new
Penal Code was adopted 7 which continued the previous definition of murder but divided murder into first and second degrees.
Punishment for first degree murder was death or imprisonment
in the penitentiary for life' while punishment for second degree
murder was fixed at imprisonment in the penitentiary for not
less than ten nor more than thirty years.' 9 This punishment
for first degree murder continued in effect until 1915 when the
legislature abolished capital punishment for first degree
20
murder.
An examination of the statutes of the various states defining
the degrees of murder discloses a wide variety of conduct which
14. Compiled laws of the Territory of Dakota (1887) §6442.
15. It should be noted that section 12-2709 of the 1943 North Dakota Code entitled "Premeditation; Meaning of: Design to Effect Death Inferred" and which
reads: "A design to effect death sufficient to constitute murder may be formed
instantly before committing the act by which it is carried into execution, and is
inferred from the fact of killing unless the circumstances raise a reasonable doubt
as to whether such design existed," refers simply to a premeditated design to effect
death being the consolidation of two sections from the previous code concerning such
design and not the words of art premediated killing as a distinguishing factor
between first and second degree murder.
16. Compiled laws of the Territory of Dakota (1887) §6449.
17. Upon the admission of North Dakota to statehood, there was a feeling that
action should be taken to adapt the laws then in force to the constitution of the
state. Thus chapter 82 of the 1891 session laws of North Dakota provided for the
compilation, publication, distribution and sale of the laws of the state of North
Dakota and authorized the appointment of a commission of three for this purpose.
This commission met and after some study prepared recommendations to accomplish
their objects but due to the protracted contest for the election of United States
senator during the 1893 session of the legislature no action was taken. However, by
chapter 74 of the 1893 session laws of North Dakota a new commission was authorized to codify and revise the laws under the following general titles: The Political
Code, the Civil Code, the Code of Civil Procedure, the Probate Code, the Justices'
Code, the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure. The 1895 legislature
after consideration and some changes adopted these Codes. (See: Preface to 1895
North Dakota Code.)
18. North Dakota Code (1895) §7068.
19. North Dakota Code (1895) §7069.
20. Chapter 63 of the 1915 session laws of North Dakota presently contained in
1943 North Dakota-Code section 12-2713 which reads: "Every person convicted of
murder in the first degree shall be punished by confinement at hard labor in the
penitentiary for life. If the person shall be convicted of murder in the first degree
while under life sentence upon a conviction of murder in the first degree, he may be
punished by death."
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may constitute the highest degree of murder; however, running
through these statutes are certain common patterns so that the
states can be said to fall within certain classes.
There is the class of which Florida is typical which defines
first degree murder as: "The unlawful killing of a human being
when perpetrated from a premeditated design to effect death
of the person killed or any human being... shall be murder
within this class is
in the first degree .... ,'21 Also included
24
23
Minnesota, 22 Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
There is another class of statutes of which Arizona is typical
which provides: ". . . or any other kind of willful, deliberate
and premeditated killing... is murder in the first degree .... "2 5
constituting
Identical in wording of this category of elements
27
26
first degree murder are the statutes of Arkansas, California,
Idaho, 28 Iowa, 29 Kansas, 30 Maryland, 31 Montana,3 2 New Mexico,3 3 North Carolina,3 4 Vermont, 35 Virginia, 36 and West Virginia.3 7 Because of the historical connection between North
and South Dakota it should be observed that the present South
Dakota statutes 8 do not divide murder into degrees but retain
almost identically the definition applicable in the Dakota Territory and in North Dakota prior to 1895.
The present North Dakota statute is peculiar in that the qualifying words willful, deliberate,and premeditated are connected
with the disjunctive "or" rather than the conjunctive "and."
Since North Dakota seemingly stands alone, the question is
posed-Was "or" purposely substituted for "and" or was the
substitution an act of inadvertence?
21. Florida Code (1941) §782.04.
22. Minn. Stat. Ann. (1945) §619.07: "The killing of a human being, . . . when
perpetrated with a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed or of
another."
23. Wise. Stat. (1947) §340.02: "Such killing, when perpetrated from premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed or of any human being, shall
be murder in the first degree . . . "
24. Wyoming Compiled Stat. (1945) §9-201 reads: "Whoever purposely and with
premeditated malice . . . kills any human being, is guilty of murder in the first
degree. "
25. Ariz. Code (1939) §43-2902.
26. Arkansas Stat. (1937) §2969.
27. Deering 's Penal Code for Calif. (1937) §189.
28. Idaho Code Ann. (1947) §18-4003.
29. Iowa Code (1946) §690.2.
30. Kansas Gen. Stat. Ann. (1935) §21-401.
31. Maryland Ann. Code (1939) Art. 27 §475.
32. Rev. Code of Montana (1935) §10955.
33. New Mexico Stat. (1941) §41-2404.
34. North Carolina Gen. Stat. (1943) §14-17.
35. Vermont Stat. (1947) §8240.
36. Virginia Code (1942) §4394.
37. West Virginia Code (1943) §5916.
38. South Dakota Code (1939) §13.2007.
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However close these words may be in connotation to the layman, the decided cases attempted to establish that they were

not synonyms of precisely the same meaning. Thus the Court
of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey stated with respect to an
instruction on these words that ". . . however brief may be the

time required for the performance of any one of the three
mental acts involved in murder in the first degree, viz., premeditation, willfulness (i.e., intention) and deliberation, the
fact remains that they are not only distinct mental acts but also
that one succeeds another. . . [and] they cannot therefore be
synchronous as is implied in this instruction.' ' 9 So also the
Kansas Supreme Court,4 0 after admitting that other states had
held these words to be synonymous, 41 stated that ". . . it has
long been determined here that "premeditatedly" has reference, as the literal meaning of the word implies, to having
thought over the matter beforehand, and "deliberately" pertains more to the manner of committing the act, or to the fact
that its commission was determined upon in cold blood. The
court then proceeded to illustrate that it might be possible for
the accused to have thought the matter over and decided to kill
another and then to come upon the victim suddenly and commit
the homicide in the heat of passion so that it could be said to
have been committed premeditatedly, but not deliberately. Despite the most sincere efforts of the jurists to keep each of these
terms within its proper sphere, an examination of the instructions frequently given by trial courts demonstrates that in practice it is impossible to explain to the lay jury with unerring
accuracy these distinct and separate mental states requisite for
first degree murder.42 Even a cursory glance in "Words and
Phrases" will clearly indicate the hodgepodge condition43 which
exists. The lines are far from being clear and distinct.
The early decisions did not shed much light on the problem
whether first degree murder is distinguished from second degree murder by the three fold requirement of "willful, deliberate and premeditated killing" or merely by any one or a
combination of these words. In State v. Noah,'4 the information
charged first degree murder and used the conjunctive alleging
that the fatal shooting was with ". . . an unlawful, willful and
39.
40.
41.

State v. Clayton, 83 N.J.L. 673, 85 Atl. 173 (1912).
State v. Johnson, 92 Kans. 441, 140 Pac. 839 (1914).
Cook v. State, 46 Fla. 20, 35 So. 665, 676 (1903); Bower v. State, 5 Mo. 364

(1838).
42.

For a critical analysis see Knudson, Murder by the Clock (1939) 24 WA-h.

43.
44.

33 Words & Phrases, 325 (1940).
State v. Noah, 20 N.D. 281, 124 N.W. 1121 (1910).

U.L.Q. 305.
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premeditated and deliberate intent to kill.. ... " The court
pointed out that "Murder is divided into two degrees, by the
statute, according to the facts and circumstances attending the
killing, depending upon the presence or absence of deliberation
and premeditation." The court then proceeded to state ". . . If
the killing was willful and unlawful, but done without deliberation or premeditation, the offense would be murder in the
second degree."
In State v. Mueller,4 51 the defendant convicted of second degree
murder complained that the trial court had not properly instructed the jury as to what constitutes first degree murder and
what constitutes second degree murder. The Supreme Court
affirming the conviction approved the trial court's instructions
which explained "In order to constitute murder in the first
degree as charged in the information, the killing must have been
willful, with malice aforethought, and with premeditation and
deliberation. There must have been a specific, deliberate, premeditated intention to take life, unaccompanied by any circumstances of mitigation. The generally accepted meaning of the
word 'premeditation' is prior determination to do the act in
question and then determination to do it, but it is not essential
that this intention should exist for any considerable period of
time before it was carried out. If the determination is formed
deliberately and upon due reflection it makes no difference how
soon the fatal resolve was carried into execution. An act is
willfully done when done intentionally and on purpose. Murder
in the second degree differs from murder in the first degree only
in the fact that as to the second degree there is no premeditation or deliberation. Thus, where a person forms a design to
kill in the midst of a conflict and immediately executes such
design, the killing is not premeditated, and is therefore no
higher offense than murder in the second degree." It is readily
seen that the court was inexact in its requirements for first
degree murder and approved inconsistent statements in this
single instruction.
However in State v. Carter, 6 the court in affirming a second
degree murder conviction considered the trial court's instructions that to convict the defendant of first degree murder the
jury must find that the killing was ". . . willful, deliberate and
premeditated." The Supreme Court stated "This stated that
law perhaps more favorably to the defendant than the language
of the statute justifies. It does not appear that all of these
45.
46.

State v. Mueller, 40 N.D. 35, 53, 168 N.W. 66 (1918).
State v. Carter, 50 N.D. 270, 195 N.W. 567 (1923).
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elements, to wit: willfulness, deliberation and premeditation,
must be present, but that if anyone of them is, it is sufficient.
The disjunctive 'or' not 'and' is used in the statute." This
decision would seem to finally authoritatively settle that the
North Dakota statute presents a unique standard for first
degree murder and that the disjunctive was used intentionally.
Conclusion
The basis of the distinction between the degrees of murder
is one of severity of punishment whereby the punishment may
be adapted to the heinousness of the act. It is submitted that
in the class of homicides perpetrated with malice aforethought
sufficient to constitute murder and with a degree of "intention"
sufficiently deliberate and premeditated to call for the highest
punishment, the North Dakota statute using the disjunctive
"or"I is more workable at the trial court level with the lay jury
than the conjunctive "and" with its resulting complication
of instructions that is almost necessarily a result from an attempt to give distinct meanings to the three different terms
although it is then conceded that "...
they may be as instantaneous as successive thoughts of the mind. 4 7 The alternative
seems to be bluntly expressed by Justice Weaver in his dissenting 48opinion in Downing v. Farmers' Mutual Fire Insurance
Co.,

in which he stated that regardless of how solemnly and

faithfully the trial courts go through the perfunctory routine in
their instructions the jurors will ignore it in their deliberations.
47. People v. Aranda, 83 Pac. 2d 928 (Calif. 1938).
48. Downing v. Farmers' Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 158 Iowa 1, 138 N.W. 917
(1912) involving instructions to jurors as to the use of their own knowledge and
experience in determining the issues of fact in the case.

